The equal distribution of decision-making powers has been declared as a goal for development itself. Many crucial decisions that determine the future of a society are taken at the household level. We seek to elicit the willingness to implement revealed preferences within the household. A representative sample of 640~individuals residing in Cairo, Egypt, were confronted with the decision to donate from a joint income to the Egyptian Red Crescent. In a first step, subjects made donation decisions after being paired either with their spouses, or a randomly chosen participant from the same population.
Higher order risk preferences play an important role in economics, most prominently in the theory of saving under uncertainty. Leland (1968) suggests that under uncertain income prudent individuals increase savings as a precautionary measure. To test this proposition we present a new experimental method to elicit higher order risk preferences. The method we propose uses a non-parametric estimation of the utility function using P-splines. Using this method we can compute well-known theoretically derived measures of the intensities of prudence and risk aversion.
Revise and resubmit European Economic Review
Societies that set norms restraining opportunistic behavior can escape the tragedy of commons and sustain cooperation. Strikingly though, in most societies women remain under-represented in institutions that enforce social norms. For example, women represent less than 20 percent of judges in the Supreme Court and 12 percent of police force in the United States. This differences are even larger in developing countries. This paper investigates the supply side factors that affect the willingness to act as a ‘hired gun’ or delegated party that sanctions bad behavior.